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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

VIETNAM: Changing Economic Aid Relationships

Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea will force Hanoi to rely increasingly on Soviet economic assistance, now estimated to be at least \$500 million annually. The diversion of manpower and materials for military operations in Kampuchea and heightened readiness along the China-Vietnam border have boosted demand for imported food and fuel and will further slow Vietnam's economic performance.

Western donors are reassessing their aid programs to Vietnam, both in protest against Hanoi's military moves and in deference to relations with China. Japan--Vietnam's most important non-Communist aid and trade partner--is reviewing its aid agreement signed last month for 150,000 tons of rice and \$70 million in loans and grants. The Dutch are considering freezing \$25 million in unspent aid from previous programs. Although Sweden has reportedly boosted its aid commitment for 1979 from \$88 million to \$92 million, Swedish Prime Minister Ullsten said last week that Vietnam risks a "reconsideration" of the aid it receives from Nordic countries, and the aid question is likely to come up for additional debate. Other Western donors and multilateral agencies are likely to reevaluate their programs as well.

Among Communist countries, the USSR's closest East European allies may feel compelled to increase their estimated \$125 million in annual aid to Vietnam by a token amount and to give symbolic aid to the new Vietnamese-backed government in Kampuchea. Several East European countries have picked up some Chinese projects in Vietnam in the wake of China's termination last year of its estimated \$300 million in annual aid to Hanoi.

Yugoslavia and Romania have been critical of Vietnam's military move, but may reluctantly continue their \$5 million aid program to Hanoi.

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ISRAEL: West Bank Water

Because Israel would lose control of more than onethird of its water supply if it withdrew from the West Bank, Prime Minister Begin will almost certainly stand by his promise to retain Israeli control over water rights in any resolution of the West Bank controversy. Israel already uses more than 95 percent of its fresh water supply, and the most feasible and least expensive means of augmenting that supply could only partially meet growing demand over the next several years.

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Of Israel's total usable water resources, more than half is provided by groundwater, mainly from two large aquifers--water-bearing underground zones. The larger of these lies under both the West Bank and Israel proper.

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Agriculture will continue to be predominant in the West Bank economy, and improved irrigation systems are essential to its growth. If the Israelis did not control the use of water, such improvements would lower the water table in nearby parts of Israel, dry up Israeli wells, and increase salt water intrusion under Israel's coastal plain.

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Israeli experts have determined that the only significant and relatively inexpensive supplementary source of water is recycled sewage. Treated sewage from the Tel Aviv recycling facility, now in operation about two years, can be used on selected crops at one-eighth the cost of desalinated water. Projected annual production from this facility eight years from now is only 100 million cubic meters, less than 7 percent of present resources. The only other proposed facility, at Haifa, is not yet even in the detailed planning stage.

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BANGLADESH: Economic Gains

Bangladesh is now into its fourth year of good economic performance. Favorable weather, greater political stability, and continued large-scale support from foreign aid donors have contributed to agricultural and industrial progress. Nonethele<u>ss, most Banglad</u>eshis remain desperately poor.

President Ziaur Rahman has emphasized rural programs and population control and has directed a gradual reduction in government regulation of imports and prices--except in foodgrain marketing. In the industrial sector, the government has emphasized better use of manufacturing capacity, completion of projects, and a greater role for the private sector. Zia has had trouble, however, getting economic policies fully implemented because competent officials are scarce and administrative structures inadequate.

Foodgrain production has grown at a 3.3 percent annual rate since fiscal year 1975, but Bangladesh will be hard pressed to keep long-term foodgrain output ahead of population growth. Despite record grain production, per capita availability of foodgrain in Fiscal Year 1978 was probably lower than in the early 1970s. Many poor people cannot afford adequate food--a more intractable problem than growing or importing sufficient supplies. Foreign donors and Bangladeshi officials have had difficulty balancing the conflicting goals of high prices for farmers, low prices for consumers, reduced budget subsidies, and lower grain imports.

Economic recovery has not eased Bangladesh's severe balance-of-payments problems. Imports are still two to four times as large as exports, and foreign aid continues to finance the bulk of investment and part of current consumption. Bangledesh has also come to depend on growing remittances from overseas workers in Middle Eastern The gains in foreign exchange, however, have countries. been offset by a loss of trained personnel.

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BOTSWANA: Meeting on Guerrillas

//Botswanan, Rhodesian, and South African officials are scheduled to meet in Pretoria this week to discuss the use of Botswana by guerrillas as a staging area.

The South Africans and Rhodesians will no doubt press Botswana to enforce more rigorously its announced policy of denying its territory for sanctuary and transit by guerrillas. Botswana has but meager security forces, and the government will find it difficult--if not

Peru: Moves Against Chile

impossible -- to comply with such demands.//

Peru on Saturday declared Chilean Ambassador to Peru Bulnes persona non grata and called home Peru's Ambassador to Chile. The Peruvians also announced the execution that day of a former Peruvian Air Force sergeant accused of having engaged in espionage for Chile. After the Chilean Foreign and Interior Ministers reportedly met at length, the Chilean Government Saturday night expressed regret at Peru's action and asserted that any acts of espionage were "isolated individual actions" not based on higher orders. These developments are surprising, although longstanding Chilean-Peruvian tensions are likely to be heightened this year by the centennial observance of the War of the Pacific. Peru's security concerns are genuine, but the resort to such serious moves may also reflect a desire by the military government to divert attention from pressing domestic problems.

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UNCTAD: International Wheat Negotiations

The UN Committee on Trade and Development negotiating conference for a new International Wheat Agreement will reconvene today in Geneva. In the three months since the last negotiating conference, the US and the EC have agreed on international wheat price support levels, the more important of the two issues on which they deadlocked. They will now attempt to obtain a consensus among other participating countries on this part of the agreement. The negotiations, which have been going on for a year, are of major importance to wheat-importing countries because of their implications for guaranteed access to supplies, as well as to wheat exporters primarily because of their price stabilization goal.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

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USSR: Dollar Defense Activities Comparisons

The following is an abridged version of an unclassified paper presenting the CIA's latest comparison, in dollar terms, of US and Soviet defense activities. The mission definitions follow the guidelines in the Defense Planning and Programming Categories issued by the Department of Defense in November 1978.

The military establishments of the USSR and the US are difficult to compare because they differ so much in missions, structures, and characteristics. Any common denominator used for comparative sizing--such as dollar costs--is imperfect, and this analysis should not be used alone as a definitive indicator of the relative effectiveness of US and Soviet military forces. The data presented here are expressed in constant 1978 (midyear) dollars so that trends in the cost estimates reflect changes in military forces and activities rather than inflation. The US figures have been converted to calendar year outlays and adjusted to achieve compara-

For the 1968-78 period, the cumulative estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense activities exceeded US outlays by over 10 percent. Estimated in constant dollars, Soviet defense activities increased at an average annual rate of 3 percent, with growth rate fluctuations reflecting primarily the phasing of major procurement programs for missiles, aircraft, and ships. Evidence on weapon systems currently in production and development, continuing capital construction at major defense industries plants, and the increasing costs of modern weapons indicate that the long-term growth trend in Soviet defense activities will probably continue into the 1980s.

In contrast, the trend in US defense outlays in constant dollars has been downward for most of the period. US outlays declined continuously from the Vietnam peak

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of 1968 until 1976. They increased slightly in 1977 and grew by 3 percent in 1978 as increases in procurement and research and development offset continuing declines in personnel costs. As a result of these diverging trends, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense activities caught up with US defense outlays in 1971 and exceeded them by a widening margin until 1977. In 1978 the Soviet total was about \$146 billion, nearly 45 percent higher than the US total of \$102 billion.

Over the 1968-78 period, the level of Soviet activity for strategic forces (exclusive of research and development) measured in dollars was two and a half times that of the US. Soviet activities showed a slight dip in the early 1970s with the completion of third-generation ICBM deployment programs, but they rose in the mid-1970s with the deployment of fourth-generation systems. US activities declined steadily until 1976, when they began growing at a slow rate. In 1978 the Soviet level was about three times that of the US.

Estimated dollar costs of Soviet activities for general purpose forces (exclusive of research and development) have exceeded comparable US outlays since 1970, and the gap widened every year until 1978. For the 1968-78 period, the Soviet total for this category was about 35 percent higher than the US total. The US level of support activities has exceeded that of the Soviet Union over the 1968-78 period by approximately 35 percent when measured in dollar terms, but the difference has narrowed significantly over the period. Support activities account for 50 percent of the total US defense outlays and some 30 percent of the total estimated dollar cost of the USSR's defense activities for the entire period.

Soviet and US defense activities can also be compared in terms of major resource categories: military investment, operating costs, and research and development costs.

The trends in military investment followed closely those for total defense costs in both countries. The Soviet investment estimate showed an upward trend but

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displayed cycles in annual growth rates that were related to the phasing of major procurement programs—especially those for missiles and aircraft. The estimated dollar cost of Soviet investment programs was fairly constant during the early 1970s, rose in the mid-1970s, and declined slightly in 1978. This dip occurred because several major procurement programs have ended or are nearing completion. New systems are expected to enter production in the next year or so, however, resulting in another cyclical increase. The US investment figure fell continuously from 1968 until 1975 and then increased at a slow rate before jumping 25X1 substantially in 1978.

The estimated dollar cost of Soviet military investment exceeded comparable US spending by about 75 or 80 percent in 1975-77 and by about 65 percent in 1978. For the entire period it was 30 percent higher.

Measured in dollar terms, operating costs made up the largest share of the total defense costs for both countries. Estimated Soviet dollar costs in this category grew continuously during the period, reflecting growing force levels, and exceeded those of the US by a widening margin after 1971. By 1978 they were 25 percent above comparable US outlays. US outlays declined rapidly after 1968 until the mid 1970s, reflecting the reduction and eventual end of the Vietnam involvement. Since that time the increase in operations and maintenance costs has offset the continued decline of personnel costs so that operating costs as a whole 25X1 have remained fairly constant.

OVERNIGHT REPORTS

(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)

Portugal

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The US Embassy reports that the Lisbon Office Workers' Union--the largest, best-financed, and best-organized union in Portugal--appears to have voted last Thursday to affiliate with the non-Communist General Workers' Union (UGT) rather than the Communist-led Intersindical, which has been predominant on the Portuguese labor scene. The Embassy now sees a "bright" future for the non-Communist association, which has its first congress this week, as a viable alternative to the Intersindical.

COMMENT: The non-Communist labor organizers had been expected to do well among such white-collar workers. Trade union activity in Portugal is especially significant for its influence on the productive sectors of the economy, and there the Communists clearly do have the greatest support. The non-Communist association's prospects will also be affected by the often stormy relations between its political backers, the Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party.

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USSR-Italy

Foreign Minister Gromyko today begins a five-day official visit to Italy, where considerable controversy has developed over President Brezhnev's recent letter to Prime Minister Andreotti warning against Western arms sales to China. The letter has been published in Italy, and the Socialist-leaning newspaper La Republica, for example, yesterday termed it "rude interference in the sovereign affairs of a nation." The Communist Party daily l'Unita only mentioned the letter without comment in a dispatch filed from Moscow. Gromyko is scheduled to confer Wednesday with Pope John Paul II; he had papal audiences with Paul VI in 1966 and 1974.

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Algeria
The government announced yesterday that a successor to President Boumediene, who died on 27 December, will be elected on 7 February. The only candidate to be voted on will be selected at the congress of the ruling National Liberation Front that opens Saturday.
Jordan
King Hussein begins an overnight visit to Saudi Arabia today. According to Amman radio quoting an official Jordanian source, Hussein will confer with King Khalid and other senior Saudi officials on "Arab affairs in light of the recent developments in the area."

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